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We present and analyze a protocol for quantum steganography where the sender (Alice) encodes
her steganographic information into the error syndromes of the perfect (five-qubit) quantum error-
correcting code, and sends it to the receiver (Bob) over a depolarizing channel. Alice and Bob
share a classical secret key, and hide quantum information in such a way that to an eavesdropper
(Eve) without access to the secret key, the quantum message looks like an innocent codeword with
a typical sequence of quantum errors. We calculate the average rate of key consumption, and show
how the protocol improves in performance as information is spread over multiple codeword blocks.
Alice and Bob utilize different encodings to optimize the average number of steganographic bits that
they can send to each other while matching the error statistics of the depolarizing channel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The art and science of information hiding or steganog-
raphy has been around for centuries, if not millennia.
The word itself comes from the Greek words steganos
which means “covered,” and graphia which means “writ-
ing.” The art of information hiding dates back to 440
B.C. to the Greeks. In The Histories, Herodotus records
two incidents of the use of steganography. In the first in-
cident Demaratus a Greek king uses a wax tablet to warn
the Spartans of an impending attack by the Persian king
Xerxes [1]. Wax tablets were used as reusable writing
surfaces and constructed from wooden bases. Demaratus
scratched the steganographic message on the wood, and
then covered it with beeswax. Once the Spartans received
the wax tablet from the courier, all that they needed to
do was to melt the wax and read the hidden warning. In
another story Herodotus records how Histiaeus tattoos a
secret message on the shaved scalp of his slave, and then
waits for the hair to grow back before dispatching him
to the Ionian city of Miletus. The ancient Chinese used
a wooden mask with holes cut out at random places to
use as a steganographic device. They would place the
wooden block on a blank sheet of paper and after writ-
ing the secret message in the holes they would fill in the
blanks in the paper with regular text. The mask acted
as a secret key to unlock the hidden message. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, people hid secret
messages in logarithm tables by introducing deliberate
errors in the least significant digits.
The term steganography was first used in 1499 by Jo-
hannes Trithemius in his Steganographia which was one
of the first treatises on the use of cryptographic and
steganographic techniques [2]. The study of modern
steganography was initiated by Simmons, who presented
∗ bilalsha@usc.edu
it in terms of the following paradigm [3]. Alice and Bob
are imprisoned in two different cells that are far apart.
They would like to devise an escape plan but the only
way they can communicate with each other is through a
courier who is loyal to and under the command of the
warden (Eve, the adversary) of the penitentiary. The
courier leaks all information to the warden. If the warden
suspects that either Alice or Bob are conspiring to escape
from the penitentiary, she will cut off all communication
between them, and move both of them to a maximum se-
curity cell. It is assumed that prior to their incarceration
Alice and Bob had access to a shared secret key which
they will later exploit to send secret messages hidden in
a cover text. Can Alice and Bob devise an escape plan
without arousing the suspicion of the warden?
Steganography is inherently different from cryptogra-
phy. In cryptography, an encryption algorithm acts on
the secret message, utilizing a key (private or public).
The resulting message (or “ciphertext”’) looks like gib-
berish to an eavesdropper (Eve) who does not have access
to the secret key. However, by observing that the trans-
mitted ciphertext is gibberish, Eve can conclude that
the message contains private information. By contrast,
in steganography we do not necessarily need to encrypt
the secret message. Rather, we hide it within a larger
plaintext message, often referred to as the “covertext”
or “cover-work.” The resulting message, or “stego-text,”
appears to be an irrelevant or benign message to Eve. In
the usual steganographic protocol we assume that Alice
and Bob have access to a secure, shared secret key. Al-
ice uses this key together with an embedding function to
hide the secret message, and Bob uses the same key to
extract it. Alice can go a step further by first encrypt-
ing the message and then hiding the ciphertext inside
the covertext, generally at the cost of greater key usage.
Bob, on receiving the stego-text would first extract the
ciphertext and then decrypt it to obtain the final secret
message, using the shared key for both steps.
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2Relatively little research has been done in quantum
steganography. The idea of hiding secret messages as
the error syndromes of a quantum error-correcting code
(QECC) was introduced by Julio Gea-Banacloche in [4].
In his formulation Alice and Bob use the three-bit repeti-
tion code to transmit classical messages to each other us-
ing a shared secret key. All the noise in the channel that
Eve perceives is because of these deliberate errors that
Alice applies. In his model he assumes that Alice and Bob
share a binary-symmetric channel. This work does not
address the issue of whether the errors would resemble
a plausible channel, nor does it consider the case where
the channel contains intrinsic noise. Natori gives a simple
treatment of quantum steganography which is a modifi-
cation of super-dense coding [5]. Martin introduced a
notion of quantum steganographic communication based
on a variation of Bennett and Brassard’s quantum-key
distribution (QKD), hiding a steganographic channel in
the QKD protocol [6]. Curty et. al. proposed three
different quantum steganographic protocols [7].
In our earlier work [8], we built on the approach of Gea-
Banacloche in hiding information as errors in a quan-
tum codeword. We showed that such schemes can hide
quantum as well as classical information; we proposed
a quantitative measure of “innocence” (or secrecy), and
derived rates of secret communication for Alice and Bob
under particular assumptions about Eve’s knowledge of
the channel, as well as key-consumption rates. We also
addressed the issue of communicating over a channel con-
taining intrinsic noise.
The day may come when quantum networks are ubiq-
uitous. Steganographic techniques may be useful as
a way of authenticating quantum communications in
distributed quantum information processing where the
sender and receiver don’t control all intermediate nodes
of the network; such uses of steganography for authen-
tication are often called “watermarking” in the classical
case. Quantum steganography gives a different kind of
cryptographic protocol that may allow both secret and
secure communication of quantum and classical informa-
tion over quantum channels.
In Section II we detail a protocol to hide four qubits
in the [[5, 1, 3]] five-qubit code (the “perfect code”). This
protocol works by hiding information in the codewords
of the perfect code in such a way that to Eve they look
like depolarizing errors. In Section III we numerically es-
timate the optimal number of qubits that Alice can send
to Bob on average using eight distinct encodings, and
list the encoding using single-qubit errors. We calculate
the key consumption rates in Section IV. We then con-
sider encoding into a longer sequence of five-qubit code
blocks in Section V, and compare this to the theoretically
achievable rate for a large block code. We show that en-
coding across multiple blocks significantly enhances the
secret communication rate, though it cannot quite match
that of a large single code block. We conclude with a dis-
cussion of these results.
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Relat ively li t t le research has been done in quantu
steganogr phy. The id a of hiding secret messages as
the error syndromes of a quantum error-correct ing code
(Q E C C) was introduced by Julio Gea-Banacloche in [4].
In his formulation A lice and Bob use the three-bit repet i-
t ion code to transmit classical messages to each other us-
ing a shared secret key. A ll the noise in the channel that
E ve perceives is because of these deliberate errors that
A lice applies. In his model he assumes that A lice and Bob
share binary-symmetric channel. This work does not
address the issue of whether the errors would resemble
a plausible channel, nor does i t consider the case where
the channel contains intrinsic noise. Natori gives a simple
treatment of quantum steganography which is a modifi-
cation of super-dense coding [5]. Martin introduced a
notion of quantum steganographic communication based
on a variat ion of Bennet t and Brassard’s quantum-key
distribution (Q K D), hiding a steganographic channel in
the Q K D protocol [6]. Curty et . al. proposed three
different quantum steganographic protocols [7].
In our earlier work [8], we built on the approach of Gea-
Banacloche in hiding information as errors in a quan-
tum codeword. We showed that such schemes can hide
quantum as well as classical information; we proposed
a quantitat ive measure of “innocence” (or secrecy), and
derived rate of secret c mmunication for A lice d B b
under part icula a sumptions about Eve’s knowledge of
the channel, as well as key-consumption rates. We also
addressed the issue of communicating over a channel con-
taining intrinsic noise.
The day may come when quantum networks are ubiq-
uitous. Steganographic techniques may be useful as
a way of authenticating quantum communications in
distributed q information processing where the
sender and receiver d n’t control ll intermediate nodes
of the network; s ch uses f steganography for authen-
tication are often called “watermarking” in the classical
case. Quantum steganography gives a different kind of
cryptographic protocol tha may allow both secret and
secure communication of quantum and classical informa-
tion over quantum channels.
In Sect ion I I we detail a protocol o ide four qubits
in the [[5, 1, 3]] five-qubit code (the “perfect code”). This
protocol works by hiding information in the codewords
of the perfect code in such a way that to Eve they look
like depolarizing errors. In Sect ion I I I we numerically es-
t imate the optimal number of qubits that A lice can send
to Bob on average using eight dist inct encodings, and
list the encoding using single-qubit errors. We calculate
the key consumption rates in Sect ion I V . We then con-
sider encoding into a longer sequence of five-qubit code
blocks in Sect ion V , and compare this to the theoret ically
achievable rate for a large block code. We show that en-
coding across multiple blocks significantly enhances the
secret communication rate, though it cannot quite match
that of a large single code block . We conclude with a dis-
cussion of these results.
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FIG. 1. Encoding circuit for the perfect code. The H gate is
a Hadamard gate, and the two-qubit gates are CNOT gates.
The first four qubits are ancilla qubits and the fifth qubit |ψc〉
is the cover-qubit.
g1 X Z Z X I
g2 I X Z Z X
g3 X I X Z Z
g4 Z X I X Z
X X X X X X
Z Z Z Z Z Z
TABLE I. Stabilizer generators g1, . . . , g4, and logical oper-
ators X and Z for the perfect code. The convention in the
above generators is that Y = ZX.
II. HIDING QUANTUM INFORMATION IN
THE PERFECT CODE
We introduced a general version of the protocol that we
present in this sect ion in Ref. in [8], but this did not give
examples of pract ical encoding techniques. In the cur-
rent paper, A lice uses the [[5, 1, 3]] code (perfect code)
to encode her stego-qubits in the syndromes of the code.
The perfect code encodes one logical qubit into five phys-
ical qubits, and is the smallest quantum error-correct ing
code that can correct an arbitrary single-qubit error [9].
I t is a nondegenerate code: each single-qubit Pauli error
is mapped to a unique syndrome. The code is a stabilizer
code with n− k = 5− 1 = 4 stabilizer generators; we list
them in Table I , along with the logical operators. A lice
and Bob can hide up to four qubits of information in this
code, which they send over a channel that to Eve looks
like a depolarizing channel. F igure 1 shows the encoding
unitary circuit for the perfect code.
The stabilizer generators in Table I can also be repre-
sented by a symplectic matrix, or Z|X matrix [10, 11].
This is the following binary matrix:
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
 (1)
This matrix is formed from the stabilizer generators in
Table I . We obtain the the left Z (left) submatrix by
insert ing a “1” wherever we see a Z in the stabilizer gen-
erators. We obtain the X (right) submatrix by insert ing
FIG. 1. Encoding circuit for the perfect code. The H gate is
a Hadamard gate, and the two-qubit gates are CNOT gates.
The first four qubits are ancilla qubits and the fifth qubit |ψc〉
is t e cover-qubit.
g1 X Z X I
g2 I X Z Z X
g3 X I X Z Z
g4 Z X I X Z
X X X X X X
Z Z Z Z Z Z
TABLE I. Stabilizer generators g1, . . . , g4, and logical oper-
ators X and Z for the perfect code. The convention in the
above generators is that Y = ZX.
II. HIDING QUANTUM INFORMATION IN
THE PERFECT CODE
We introduced a general version of the protocol that we
present in this section in Ref. in [8], but this did not give
examples of practical encoding techniques. In the cur-
rent paper, Alice uses the [[5, 1, 3]] code (perfect code)
to encode her stego-qubits in the syndromes of the code.
The perfect code encod one logical qubit into fiv phys-
ical qubits, and is the smallest quantum error-correcting
code that can correct an arbitrary single-qubit error [9].
It is a nondegenerate code: each single-qubit Pauli error
is mapped to a unique syndrome. The code is a stabilizer
code with n− k = 5− 1 = 4 stabilizer generators; we list
them in Table I, along with the logical operators. Alice
and Bob can hide up to four qubits of information in this
e, hich they send over a channe that to Eve looks
lik a depol rizing channel. Figure 1 shows the ncoding
u itary circuit for the perfect code.
The stabilizer generators in Table I can also be repre-
sented by a symplectic matrix, or Z|X matrix [10, 11].
This is the following binary matrix:
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
 (1)
This matrix is formed from the stabilizer generators in
Table I. We obtain the the left Z (left) submatrix by
3Error Syndrome Error Syndrome
IIIII 0000 IIIIZ 0001
IIZII 0010 IIIXI 0011
IXIII 0100 IIXII 0101
ZIIII 0110 IIY II 0111
XIIII 1000 IZIII 1001
IIIIX 1010 IIIIY 1011
IIIZI 1100 IY III 1101
Y IIII 1110 IIIY I 1111
TABLE II. Syndrome table of the perfect code. The error
operators are ordered according to syndrome values.
inserting a “1” wherever we see a Z in the stabilizer gen-
erators. We obtain the X (right) submatrix by inserting
a “1” wherever we see a corresponding X in the stabilizer
generator. If there is a Y in the generator, we insert a
“1” in the corresponding row and column of both the Z
and X submatrices.
We can use this matrix to find the error syndromes cor-
responding to single-qubit errors. To generate the syn-
drome of each single-qubit error operator, we take the
symplectic product of the parity check matrix 1 with the
binary vector of the error operator corresponding to a
single-qubit error. The perfect code has a total of fif-
teen single-qubit errors: X1, X2, . . . , X5, Z1, Z2, . . . , Z5
and Y1, Y2, . . . , Y5. Together with the “no error opera-
tor” IIIII these sixteen operators have sixteen distinct
syndromes, which are listed in Table II.
We now detail the steps Alice takes to hide four stego
qubits. We label Alice’s subsystem that contains the
five-qubit codeword as A, and the subsystem holding
the stego qubits as S. Using the classical secret key she
shares with Bob, Alice first applies a “twirling” operation
to each of the four stego qubits. That is, she randomly
applies I, X, Y , or Z to each qubit. To do this to four
qubits requires 8 bits of secret key. (Note that if Alice’s
stego qubits are drawn from a source that looks like the
maximally mixed state on average, twirling is not nec-
essary. For example, highly compressed quantum states
will look close to maximally mixed.) The combined A
and S subsystems, after the twirling procedure but be-
fore encoding, are in the state:
ρSA =
(
I
2
)⊗4
⊗ |0000〉〈0000| ⊗ |ψC〉〈ψC |. (2)
We can rewrite the S subsystem of the state in Eq. (2)
in the computational basis as:(
I
2
)⊗4
=
1
16
15∑
i=0
|k〉〈k|, (3)
where we denote the ket states from 0 to 15 in place of
their binary representations. We’ll use the same notation
for the four ancilla qubits in subystem A. Combining
FIG. 2. (Color online) Steganographic protocol to hide four
qubits of information |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψ4〉 using the perfect code.
Using a classical secret key shared with Bob, Alice first applies
the twirling procedure (indicated in the figure by the yellow
box) to each of her four qubits in the “stego subsystem” S.
This transforms each qubit into a maximally mixed state.
The codeword would be prepared using four ancilla qubits |0〉
along with a cover-qubit |ψC〉. We call this “subsystem A.”
The first unitary U1 (blue box) is applied to the subsystems
A and S, followed by unitary U2 (green box). These have the
effect of swapping the twirled stego qubits into the syndrome
space of the code. Finally Alice applies the encoding unitary E
to subsystem A and sends it over a channel to Bob. She traces
out subsystem S (gray box), which now is just in the state
|0〉. Upon receiving the codeword, Bob applies the decoding
circuit D. He undoes the unitary transformations U1 and U2
that were applied by Alice. Finally, he uses the shared secret
key to untwirl the qubits to obtain the original stego qubits.
Eq. (3) with Eq. (2) we get:
ρSA =
1
16
15∑
k=0
|k〉〈k|S ⊗ |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |ψC〉〈ψC |A, (4)
Alice now applies the unitary U1 (shown in the blue box
in Figure 2), defined as
U1 ≡
15∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|S ⊗ EAi ⊗OAi , (5)
where the Ei and Oi are the error operators listed in
Table III, ordered from top to bottom. The operators Ei⊗
Oi transform under the encoding unitary of the five-qubit
code into the correctable one-qubit errors of Table II.
Note that the Ei operators act on the ancilla qubits so
that Ei|0〉 ∝ |i〉.
We define the second unitary U2 depicted by the green
box in Figure 2, as:
U2 ≡
15∑
j=0
(Xj)S ⊗ |j〉〈j|A ⊗ IAC . (6)
44
FIG. 2. (Color online) Steganographic protocol to hide four qubits of information |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψ4〉 using the perfect code. Using
a classical secret key shared with Bob, Alice first applies the twirling procedure (indicated in the figure by the yellow box) to
each of her four qubits in the “stego subsystem” S. This transforms each qubit into a maximally mixed state. The codeword
would be prepared using four ancilla qubits |0〉 along with a cover-qubit |ψC〉. We call this “subsystem A.” The first unitary
U1 (blue box) is applied to the subsystems A and S, followed by unitary U2 (green box). These have the effect of swapping
the twirled stego qubits into the syndrome space of the code. Finally Alice applies the encoding unitary E to subsystem A and
sends it over a channel to Bob. She traces out subsystem S (gray box), which now is just in the state |0〉. Upon receiving the
codeword, Bob applies the decoding circuit D. He undoes the unitary transformations U1 and U2 that were applied by Alice.
Finally, he uses the shared secret key to untwirl the qubits to obtain the original stego qubits.
|0〉 !"#$%&'( • |ψ〉
|ψ〉 • !"#$%&'( |0〉
FIG. 3. Swap circuit of a qubit with an ancilla in state |0〉.
where the Ek are the single-qubit errors from Table II (in-
cluding the “no error” operator E0 = IIIII). To plausi-
bly use the five-qubit code, the error rate p must be suf-
ficiently low that it is rare for more than one single-qubit
error to occur. So if Eve intercepts this state and checks
the error syndromes, the result should look reasonable
for a codeword that has passed through the depolarizing
channel.
III. AVERAGE RATE OF STEGANOGRAPHIC
TRANSMISSION
While the encoding given in the previous section is rea-
sonable for encoding stego-qubits in a single codeword,
it would not do if Alice wants to send many messages
to Bob. It would quickly look suspicious if almost every
codeword had exactly one single-qubit error. For longer
messages, Alice must most often apply no errors, from
Ei Oi Encoded Error Syndrome i Syndrome Label
IIII I IIIII 0000 s0
IIIX Z IIIIZ 0001 s1
IIXI I IIZII 0010 s2
IIXX I IIIXI 0011 s3
IXII I IXIII 0100 s4
IXZY Y IIXII 0101 s5
ZXXI Z ZIIII 0110 s6
−IXY Y Y IIY II 0111 s7
XIII I XIIII 1000 s8
XZIX I IZIII 1001 s9
XIXI X IIIIX 1010 s10
XIXX Y IIIIY 1011 s11
XXIZ X IIIZI 1100 s12
XY IX I IY III 1101 s13
Y XXI Z Y IIII 1110 s14
XXXY X IIIY I 1111 s15
TABLE III. Encoded error operators of the perfect code.
time to time apply a single error, and perhaps occasion-
ally apply two errors (an uncorrectable error), in such a
way as to match the statistics of a depolarizing channel
with error probability p.
In this section we present details of how Alice optimizes
the number of stego-qubits that she sends to Bob by en-
FIG. 3. Swap circuit of a qubit with an ancilla in state |0〉.
Ei Oi Enc ded Err r Syndrome i Syndrome Label
IIII I IIIII 0000 s0
IIIX Z IIIIZ 0001 s1
IIXI I IIZII 0010 s2
IIXX I IIIXI 0011 s3
IXII I IXIII 0100 s4
IXZY Y IIXII 0101 s5
ZXXI Z ZIIII 0110 s6
−IXY Y Y IIY II 0111 s7
XIII I XIIII 1000 s8
XZIX I IZIII 1001 s9
XIXI X IIIIX 1010 s10
XIXX Y IIIIY 1011 s11
XXIZ X IIIZI 1100 s12
XY IX I IY III 1101 s13
Y XXI Z Y IIII 1110 s14
XXXY X IIIY I 1111 s15
TABLE III. Encoded error operators of the perfect code.
In Eq. (6) Xj is a shorthand notation for Xj1 ⊗ Xj2 ⊗
Xj3 ⊗Xj4 , where j1 · · · j4 is the binary expression for j.
After applying the unitaries U1 and U2, the system is left
in the state
ρ′ =
1
16
15∑
k=0
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ Ok|ψC〉〈ψC |Ok. (7)
Note that the original stego qubits are now in the state
|0〉. The quantum information they contained has been
swapped into the syndrome subsystem. The unitary op-
erators U1 and U2 are analogous to the two CNOT op-
erators in the usual circuit for swapping a qubit into an
ancilla in the initial state |0〉 (see Figure 3).
Alice then applies the encoding unitary UE to sub-
system A, and traces out subsystem S. The resulting
codeword must look plausible to Eve. In this case she is
trying to match the depolarizing channel:
ρ→ N (ρ) ≡ (1−p)ρ+ p
3
4∑
i=0
XiρXi+YiρYi+ZiρZi. (8)
The correctly-encoded, error-free state would be
ρc = UE (|0000〉〈0000| ⊗ |ψC〉〈ψC |)U†E . (9)
By swapping in the stego qubits into the syndrome space
as described above, Alice has effectively prepared the
state
ρ′c =
15∑
k=0
EkρcEk, (10)
where the Ek are the single-qubit errors from Table II (in-
cluding the “no error” operator E0 = IIIII). To plausi-
bly use the five-qubit code, the error rate p must be suf-
ficiently low that it is rare for more than one single-qubit
error to occur. So if Eve intercepts this state and checks
the error syndromes, the result should look reasonable
for a codeword that has passed through the depolarizing
channel.
III. AVERAGE RATE OF STEGANOGRAPHIC
TRANSMISSION
While the encoding given in the previous section is rea-
sonable for encoding stego-qubits in a single codeword,
it would not do if Alice wants to send many messages
to Bob. It would quickly look suspicious if almost every
codeword had exactly one single-qubit error. For longer
messages, Alice must most often apply no errors, from
time to time apply a single error, and perhaps occasion-
ally apply two errors (an uncorrectable error), in such a
way as to match the statistics of a depolarizing channel
with error probability p.
In this section we present details of how Alice optimizes
the number of stego-qubits that she sends to Bob by en-
coding her stego-qubits in the syndromes of the perfect
code. She either sends no stego-qubits to Bob (and ap-
plies no errors to the codeword) or she sends four stego-
qubits to him (applying either one or two errors). We
would like to maximize the number of stego-qubits that
Alice can send to Bob under the constraint that Alice’s
encoding scheme should match the probability distribu-
tion of the depolarizing channel. The channel model that
we are interested in is:
5ρ→ N (ρ) ≡ (1− p)5ρ+ p(1− p)
4
3
4∑
i=0
(
XiρXi + YiρYi + ZiρZi
)
+
p2(1− p)3
9
∑
i<j
(
XiXjρXiXj +XiYjρXiYj +XiZjρXiZj
+ YiXjρYiXj + YiYjρYiYj + YiZjρYiZj + ZiXjρ+ ZiXj + ZiYjρZiYj + ZiZjρZiZj
)
. (11)
There are of course three, four, and five qubit errors,
but it is very unlikely that such errors will occur, and
so we neglect them for this paper. The techniques we
give here could easily be used to find stego-encodings
for those cases as well; but it might appear suspicious if
Alice and Bob used an encoding that frequently suffered
uncorrectable errors.
We use three distinct classes of encodings. The first
class corresponds to no errors, and transmits no hidden
information. This always has the syndrome s0 ≡ 0000 in
Table III.
Alice’s second encoding class corresponds to all single-
qubit errors, plus no error, with equal probability. These
are the syndromes s0 ≡ 0000 to s15 ≡ 1111 in the same
table. This is the encoding described in the previous
section. So this encoding class includes a single encoding,
and transmits four stego-qubits.
The third encoding class corresponds to the set of all
two-qubit errors. There are ninety such errors. These
ninety two-qubit errors naturally divide into six sets of
fifteen errors each, where each set has one error corre-
sponding to each of the fifteen nonzero syndromes. By
also including the “no error” operator, each set corre-
sponds to an encoding that can transmit four stego-
qubits. We list these six sets in Table IV. When Alice
sends four stego-qubits to Bob, she must use all sixteen
distinct syndromes. A single row of this table, spanning
all sixteen syndromes, corresponds to a single encoding.
Each encoding proceeds exactly as described above for
the single-error case, except that the operators Ei and Oi
from Table IV are used in Eq. (5) instead of those from
Table III.
We now need to solve for how often the three classes of
encodings should be used to match the channel statistics.
Let Q0 be the fraction of times Alice uses the (trivial)
first encoding class; Q1 the fraction of times that Alice
uses the second (single-error) encoding class; and Q2 the
fraction of times that Alice uses one of the six two-error
encodings (which should be used equally often). The
channel distribution constraints are as follows:
p0 = (1− p)5 = Q0 + 1
16
(Q1 +Q2), (12)
p1 = 5p(1− p)4 = 15
16
Q1, (13)
p2 = 10p
2(1− p)3 = 15
16
Q2. (14)
In the channel constraint equations above, p0, p1, and
p2 represent the total probability of the channel apply-
ing no errors, one error, or two errors on the codewords.
The right-hand-side of the equations represent how Alice
matches the channel’s probability distribution. For ex-
ample, she always applies no errors if she uses the first
(trivial) encoding, and with probability 1/16 if she uses
one of the other encodings. We solve for Q0,1,2 to get:
Q0 = p0 − (p1 + p2)/15,
Q1 = (16/15)p1, (15)
Q2 = (16/15)p2.
Note that these numbers do not add up to 1, because we
have neglected errors of weight three or more. For small
p they will come close.
The average number of stego-qubits that Alice can
send to Bob under the above constraints is Navg =
4(Q1 + Q2) = (64/15)(p1 + p2). We plot this function
in Figure 4, along with the Shannon entropy of the chan-
nel (which is the maximum possible rate at which stego
information could be sent). Note that this curve only
makes sense for fairly small values of p; for higher values,
it is no longer correct to neglect higher-weight errors.
IV. KEY CONSUMPTION
We define the key consumption rate as the number of
classical bits of key consumed by Alice and Bob per qubit
block. Alice can send an N -qubit block to Bob by com-
bining N/5 five-qubit blocks together. How much shared
secret key do Alice and Bob require to send stegano-
graphic information to each other? In Section III we
defined Q0 as the probability of Alice using the first en-
coding to send no stego-qubits to Bob. The probability
of using the second encoding is Q1, when Alice applies
single errors to her codewords. Alice and Bob can also
use two-error encodings to send four qubits to each other,
of which there are a total of six as shown in Table IV. We
assume that each of these six encodings are equiproba-
ble, each with probability Q2/6. Therefore, there are a
total of eight different encodings that Alice and Bob must
choose from in order to send steganographic information
to each other.
For a single five-qubit block, Alice and Bob must share
three classical bits to specify which of the eight encodings
has been used. They also require an extra eight bits for
Alice to construct her four twirled qubits and for Bob to
6Syndrome i Ei ⊗Oi Encoded Error Syndrome i Ei ⊗Oi Encoded Error
0001
IZIXI XZIII
0010
ZIXIZ XZIII
IIZYY IXXII IZXZX IYIYI
−ZIZY X ZIY II ZIXZY Y IIZI
IIIXI IIZXI IIXIX XIIIX
ZIIY Y Y IIY I IZXIY IZIIY
−IZIY X IY IZI IIXIZ IIIXZ
0011
ZZXXZ Y Y III
0100
ZXIIZ ZIZII
-ZIYYX ZIXII IXZZY IIYXI
−IIY Y Y IXY II IXIZX XIIZI
IZXXX IZIIX ZXIIY Y IIIX
IIXXY XIIIY IXIZZ IIIY Y
IIXXZ IIZIZ IXZZX IIXIZ
0101
IY IXI XY III
0110
IXXII IXZII
ZXIXZ ZIIXI IXYZY IIXXI
IY IY X IZIZI −IY XZX IZIY I
IXIY I IIIY X IXXZI IIIZX
−ZXIXX Y IIIY IY XIY IY IIY
IXIXZ IXIIZ −IXY ZX IIY IZ
0111
−ZY XXZ Y ZIII
1000
XZZZY IY XII
IXXXI IXIXI XIZIZ IIYYI
IXXYX XIIY I XIIZX IXIZI
IY XXX IY IIX XIIIX IIZIX
−IXXY Z IIIZY XIIIY IIIXY
ZXXXI ZIIIZ XZIIZ IZIIZ
1001
−Y IZY X Y IY II
1010
Y IXIZ Y XIII
-YIIYY ZIIYI -XZYZY IYYII
XIZXZ IIXZI XIXII XIZII
XIIXX IIIXX XZXII IZIXI
XIIXY IIZIY XIY IZ IIXY I
XIIXZ XIIIZ −Y IXZY ZIIZI
1011
−Y ZXXZ ZY III
1100
XXIII XXIII
-YIYYX YIXII -XYZZY IZXII
XZXXI IZZII Y XIIZ Y IZII
XIXXI XIIXI −Y XIIY ZIIIX
XIXY X IXIY I XXZZI IIY IY
−XIY XZ IIY ZI XY IIZ IY IIZ
1101
XXZY Y XIXII
1110
XY Y ZY IZY II
YXIXZ YIIXI XYXII IYIXI
XXIY X IIZY I XXXZX IIZZI
XXZY Z IIY IX XXXIX IXIIX
Y XIXX ZIIIY XXY ZI IIXIY
XXIY Y IIIZZ −XXXZY IIIY Z
1111
Y Y XXZ ZZIII
0000
IIIII IIIII
-XXYYY XIYII IIIII IIIII
XYXXI IY ZII IIIII IIIII
XXY Y Z IIXIX IIIII IIIII
XXXXY IXIIY IIIII IIIII
Y XXXI Y IIIZ IIIII IIIII
TABLE IV. Table of double-qubit errors. The error operators in bold represent a single encoding. The table represents a
total of six different encodings where each encoding utilizes sixteen distinct error operators and their corresponding distinct
syndromes.
7FIG. 4. (Color online) The red curve shows the Shannon
entropy of the binary-symmetric channel. The blue curve
underneath the entropy curve is the rate of steganographic
information maximized for various values of the error-rate p
of the channel. In the limit of large N , encoding in a single
large block (rather than multiple sub-blocks) can achieve a
rate of steganographic transmission approaching the Shannon
entropy [8].
untwirl these qubits once he receives the steganographic
information. So Alice and Bob would consume twelve
classical secret key bits for each five-qubit block, if they
encode one block at a time, and so for an N -qubit block
they would consume at most 12N classical bits of key—
not a very economical protocol. In fact, it would be less
than that, since Alice needs no key bits to do twirling for
the first, trivial, encoding. Taking this into account, the
total key consumption rate would be (3 + 8(Q1 +Q2))/5
secret key bits per qubit.
However, Alice and Bob can do much better than this
by encoding into multiple block at once. In the limit of
large N , the number of bits that they require to specify
the key is given by the Shannon entropy of the probability
distribution of the three different encodings. This gives
us a key usage rate of
K =
1
5
(−Q0 log2Q0 −Q1 log2Q1 −Q2 log2Q2/6) (16)
key bits per qubit. For small p this dramatically
outperforms the rate for encoding one block at a time.
V. ASYMPTOTICS
We would like to quantify the steganographic rate
when Alice sends a large block code to Bob. We de-
pict the asymptotic scenario in Figure 5. The chan-
nel has no intrinsic noise of its own. Whatever noise
that Eve observes on the channel is due to Alice. We
address the problem of where the channel has intrin-
sic noise in [8].The N -qubit block code is constructed
by concatenating M five-qubit blocks. Alice hides her
steganographic information in the N -qubit block, and
we would like to estimate the number of stego-qubits per
N -qubit block that Alice can send to Bob while match-
ing the statistics of the depolarizing channel. Because of
the low error-rate of the channel most of the time Alice
applies no error to her M code blocks. This corresponds
to syndrome s0 from Table III. Occasionally she applies a
single error. We label each five-qubit block by aj , where
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Each aj corresponds to one of the syn-
dromes from Table III. In this section we define a string
to be a string of syndromes for a concatenated M five-
qubit blocks where each five-qubit block is labelled by its
corresponding syndrome.
Let p0 = (1 − p)5 be the probability of no error on
a block. Let p1 = 1 − (1 − p)5 be the probability of
a single error on a block. For small values p we can
approximate p0 = (1 − 5p) and p1 = 5p. If Alice hides
information in typical sequences then the total number
of such sequences is approximately 2MH(p), where H(p)
is the Shannon entropy of the channel. So the number
of qubits that Alice can hide with this encoding will be
approximately MH(p). We first calculate the Shannon
entropy H(p):
H(p) ≈ −(1− p)5 log2(1− p)5 (17)
− 151− (1− p)
5
15
log2
(
1− (1− p)5
15
)
,
≈ −(1− 5p) log2(1− 5p)− 5p log2 5p+ 5p log2 15 .
The above is an approximation because we ignore the
contribution to the Shannon entropy from double and
higher errors. We define the steganographic rate as the
number of steganographic qubits that Alice sends to Bob
per N -qubit block. In our case N = 5M . So the rate
Rtyp = log2 2
MH(p)/5M . We can expand this further
and write:
Rtyp ≈ −1
5
log2(1− 5p) + p log2
(
3(1− 5p)
p
)
. (18)
The total probability pk of all strings of weight k is:
pk ≈
(
M
k
)(
1− (1− p)5
15
)k
(1− p)5(M−k)15k , (19)
≈
(
M
k
)(
p
3
)k
(1− 5p)M−k15k .
The average number of errors in an N -qubit code block
goes like 5Mp. Let the variance be 5Mpδ, where 0 <
8δ  1. For each k from 5pM(1− δ) to 5pM(1 + δ), Alice
can choose Ck strings of weight k. Let
C =
5Mp(1+δ)∑
k=5Mp(1−δ)
Ck . (20)
Define the probability q = 1/C. Then we would like to
s7s0s4
M Blocks
Y IIIIIIIIIXI III .         .         .
FIG. 5. (Color online) Alice sends a total of M blocks con-
sisting of N = 5M qubits. We label each block with its cor-
responding syndrome, a0, a1, . . . , aM . Each aj corresponds to
a syndrome from Table III. To obtain the syndrome for the
N -qubit block we simply concatenate the syndromes.
satisfy:
qCk = Ck/C ≈ pk . (21)
The choice for the number of strings of weight k cannot
exceed
(
M
k
)
, and so Ck ≤
(
M
k
)
. From this constraint we
obtain
q ≥
(
p
3
)k
(1− 5p)M−k15k. (22)
Alice would like C to be as large as possible which means
that q must be as small as possible. This further implies
that we should set k = 5pM(1− δ). This give us
C ≈ (p/3)−5Mp(1−δ)(1− 5p)5Mp(1−δ)−M15−5Mp(1−δ) .
(23)
So the steganographic rate for this encoding Renc ≈
log2 C/5M . Finally,
Renc ≈ −1
5
log2(1− 5p) +p log2
(
(1− 5p)(5p)δ
5p(1− 5p)δ
)
. (24)
We plot the local encoding from Section III, along with
Rtyp and Renc for low values of p in Figure 6. As expected
the typical sequences encoding outperforms the local en-
coding as well as the syndrome encoding described above.
However, we do much better asymptotically with the cur-
rent encoding as opposed to the local encoding.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Steganography is the art of hiding information by dis-
guising it as something else. This idea, developed in
the classical sphere, can be adapted to hide quantum as
well as classical information—in this case, by making the
quantum information appear to be errors from a quan-
tum depolarizing channel. Alice and Bob conceal their
FIG. 6. (Color online) The green curve for Rtyp outperforms
the rates from the syndrome encoding (black) and the local
encoding (blue). To generate the black curve we chose δ =
0.005.
communication from Eve, hiding their message as errors
in a codeword for an “innocent” cover state |ψc〉, and us-
ing the resource of a shared secret random key. (Shared
entanglement would work as well, or even better.)
In this paper, we have made use of the ideas from our
earlier work [8] for a particular finite code: the five-qubit
“perfect” code. We have explicitly presented the encod-
ings needed to simulate the quantum depolarizing chan-
nel, and calculated the rate of transmission of stegano-
graphic qubits and the rate of usage of the shared se-
cret key. While we only worked out encodings that ap-
pear to be single-qubit or two-qubit errors, the same
techniques of this paper will readily yield encodings for
higher-weight errors as well.
All of this work assumed that the underlying physical
channel used by Alice and Bob is error-free. It merely
appears noisy to Eve because of the machinations of Al-
ice. In principle, steganographic information can still be
hidden even if the underlying channel is noisy. This re-
quires an additional layer of error correction, to protect
the hidden information from physical noise. In practice,
these encodings are not necessarily straightforward, since
errors that are local in physical space may appear quite
differently in the space of syndromes of the code for the
covertext. The details of such encodings, and what rates
can be practically achieved, remain work for the future.
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